Investors in a market frequently update their diverse perceptions of the values of risky assets, thus invalidating the classic CAPM's assumption of complete agreement among investors. To accommodate information asymmetry and belief updating, we have developed an empirically testable Information-adjusted CAPM, which states that the expected excess return of a risky asset/portfolio is solely determined by information-adjusted beta rather than market beta. The model is then used to analyze empirical anomalies of the classic CAPM, including a flatter relation between average return and market beta than the CAPM predicts, a non-zero Jensen's alpha, insignificant explanatory power of market beta, and size effect.
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I. Introduction
The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is one of the corner stones of modern finance theory. The Sharpe-Lintner version of the CAPM (Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965) ) postulates that the expected return on a risky asset or a portfolio of assets is a linear function of its market beta, with a positive slope equal to the expected excess return on the market portfolio and an intercept equal to the riskless interest rate. It implies that market beta is the only variable which can and is required to explain the systematic risk of securities. However, such an insightful and elegant theory has met great challenges in empirical tests. 1 Empirical evidence shows that the slope in a regression of return on market beta is small, resulting in a much flatter regression line than the theoretical security market line. The intercept of such regressions systematically deviates from the riskless rate. Many studies also report that market beta does not have power in explaining return variation. Other variables, including the size of a security, play a substantial role in explaining return variation and have even greater explanatory power than market beta.
Like other theories, the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM is built on a series of assumptions simplifying the complexity of the real world. Among them, two assumptions are relatively restrictive.
-The first assumption is complete agreement: given market clearing asset prices at t − 1, investors agree on the joint distribution of asset returns from t − 1 to t. And this distribution is the true one-that is, it is the distribution from which the returns we use to test the model are drawn. The second assumption is that there is borrowing and lending at a risk-free rate, which is the same for all investors and does not depend on the amount borrowed or lent.‖ (Fama and French (2004) , p. 26. Italic is original.) Black (1972) replaces the second assumption by assuming no risk-free asset and no risk-free borrowing or lending. The Black version of the CAPM is consistent with a 1 For recent surveys on the theory and empirical evidence of the CAPM, see Fama and French (2004) . 3 flatter slope between expected return and market beta and a non-zero Jensen's alpha but it still cannot explain other anomalies reported in empirical studies. 2 This paper intends to relax the complete agreement assumption and develop a new asset pricing model with improved predictions. Hence, it is assumed that no investor in a financial market knows the true distribution of asset returns. But they receive signals revealing the information of the true values of risky assets. Investors incorporate the new information with their prior beliefs to refine their knowledge of the market and security returns. Because investors may receive asymmetric information, their posterior beliefs about the return distribution are heterogeneous.
When the assumption of complete agreement is relaxed, the information received by investors or more precisely the distribution of information index is crucial.
The information index of a risky asset depicts the effective information possessed by investors. 3 If the information index takes the same value across all securities because of certain very particular market conditions, the market beta captures the systematic risk of an asset, in turn, the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM holds. However, the information index generally varies across securities so that the systematic risk of an asset cannot be properly measured by the market beta. Hence, we need to introduce a new benchmark portfolio-the Information-adjusted Market Portfolio (IaMP). The weight on each risky asset in the IaMP is characterized by the product of the information index of the asset and its weight in the market portfolio. With this new benchmark portfolio, we analytically derive the Information-adjusted CAPM (IaCAPM), which states that the expected return on a risky asset/portfolio is a linear function of its information-adjusted beta, with a slope equal to the expected excess return on the IaMP and an intercept equal to the riskless interest rate. The information-adjusted beta measures the systematic risk of an asset and is defined as the covariance between returns on the asset and the IaMP divided by the variance of return on the IaMP. The IaMP plays a similar role as the market portfolio in the classic CAPM and the IaCAPM remains a single-2 The Sharpe-Lintner-Black CAPM is referred to as the classic CAPM in this paper. 3 The information index is formally defined as the ratio of the unconditional precision of a security's return to the mean of the conditional precision of the return. The details are given in Section III. 4 factor market model. Nevertheless, the factor that causes systematic return differences across assets is the information-adjusted beta.
The IaCAPM implies that in empirical tests of an asset pricing model, the regression of return should be on information-adjusted beta rather than market beta in cross-sectional analysis, or on excess return on the IaMP rather than excess market return in time-series analysis. When market beta or excess market return is chosen as an explanatory variable, the model essentially turns out to be a random coefficient regression model. This is likely to be one of main reasons for various anomalies discovered in the empirical tests of the classic CAPM. Proposition 4 in the paper specifies the conditions under which the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM overstates or understates the expected return on a risky security or a portfolio of securities, and quantify the prediction error. Based on this proposition, Section IV analyzes the possible reasons for the empirical anomalies discovered in the literature.
We adopt the approach of rational expectations analysis to relax the assumption of complete agreement. Following the pioneering works of Grossman (1976) , and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , rational expectations models developed by, for example, Hellwig (1980 ), Admati (1985 , Easley and O'Hara (2004) , focus on the effect of asymmetric information on capital asset pricing. They usually assume that the prices of risky assets and signals conveying price information are normally distributed random variables. The normal distributions, accompanied by constant absolute risk aversion utility, can generate elegant linear demand functions and a closed-form solution for conditional expectations of relevant variables. Although they have been successfully used to demonstrate that the conditional CAPM (i.e., expectations are taken conditional on investors' posterior beliefs) holds in various variants (e.g., Admati (1985) ), they can hardly be applied to the analysis of unconditional expected return. 4 The reason is that 4 It is important to distinguish unconditional expectation from conditional expectation. Equilibrium prices of risky assets depend on a particular realization of random informative signals and random asset supplies in a one-period model. So, conditional on the realization of signals and supplies, the randomness of return on a risky asset stems solely from the randomness of the future value (or future price) of the asset. For unconditional expected return, however, the expectation operation should be taken over all random variables and in turn the equilibrium prices should be considered as random too. See, for example, Easley and O'Hara (2004) . 5 the assumption of normally distributed prices ultimately results in a distribution of returns for which unconditional expectation does not exist. 5 To avoid this difficulty, Easley and O'Hara (2004) focus on the analysis of unconditional expected return per share instead of the rate of return. (Throughout the paper, return means the rate of return unless otherwise specified.)
The importance of developing an asset pricing model based on unconditional expectations is twofold. First, as Jagannathan and Wang (1996) and Campbell (2000) have pointed out, even if the conditional CAPM is assumed to be true the return-beta relationship in the classic CAPM usually does not hold when expectations are taken unconditionally. Secondly, an equilibrium based on conditional expectations depends on a particular realization of random parameters and variables. But most empirical tests, which disclose various anomalies of the classic CAPM as represented by Fama and French (1992, 1993) , implicitly require an asset pricing model established on unconditional expectations. 6 In order to develop an unconditional asset pricing model and circumvent the difficulty caused by the normal distribution assumption, we extend the Easley-O'Hara (2004) model by adopting lognormal distributions of asset values and informative signals. We show that although the conditional CAPM does hold in our framework, as found by other asset pricing models of rational expectations equilibrium, the unconditional CAPM has to be modified to accommodate belief diversity among investors.
The rest of the paper is organized as the follows. Section II specifies the Bayesian belief updating process based on lognormally distributed signals. Then it completes an asymmetric information model by establishing rational expectations equilibrium. Section III calculates conditional and unconditional expected returns in equilibrium, and derives the IaCAPM by dropping the assumption of complete 5 Simple return involves the ratio of random future value to random equilibrium price and its unconditional expectation is not computable because even for two independent standard normal variables their ratio follows a Cauchy distribution, for which both mean and variance do not exist (Hogg and Craig (1995) , p. 174). Continuously compounded return is not well-defined due to the negative range of normal variates. 6 Of course, empirical test methods for conditional asset pricing models have been well developed; see for instance, Cochrane (2005). 6 agreement. It also discusses the main properties and predictions of the IaCAPM.
Section IV analyzes the anomalies documented in the empirical analysis of the classic CAPM from the IaCAPM perspective. Concluding remarks are given in the final section. Proofs of propositions and corollaries are given in Appendix A.
II. Belief Updating and Rational Expectations Equilibrium

A. Bayesian Inference
Consider a market of K risky assets and one risk-free asset. Agents in this market optimize their asset portfolios through trading securities at date 0 to maximize their expected utility at date 1. Although nobody knows the future values of risky assets, v k (k = 1,…, K), before trading, their prior distributions are common knowledge.
It is assumed that v k are independently, lognormally distributed, 7 i.e.,
(1)
There are k I signals revealing the information of the future value of risky asset k before trading. These signals, 1 (2) Some of these signals are public information observed by all investors in the market but the others are private and observed only by a portion of investors. The fraction of private signals is denoted by k  so that the fraction of signals publicly observable is
. Investors who can observe both private and public signals of asset k are called informed investors, whereas investors who only observe public signals are called uninformed investors. 8 To facilitate analysis and simplify notations, we define two statistics of these signals: 7 The assumption of independent distributions of asset values has also been adopted by other studies of asset pricing; for instance, Easley and O'Hara (2004) and O'Hara (2003) . The introduction of correlations between risky assets does not change the core result of the paper-the IaCAPM and its predictions. Appendix B to this paper, which is available upon request, outlines the derivation of the IaCAPM and other main results when all risky assets and signals are correlated. However, the assumption of independent distributions can greatly simplify algebra and ease the exposition of economic intuition. So, we keep it throughout the main text. 8 
where the conditional mean and conditional precision are given by
Uninformed investors only receive public information, h k . But the equilibrium prices of risky assets partially reveal the information contained in private signals. So, they use both h k and price signals to update their beliefs. Let p k be the equilibrium price of risky asset k. Assume that the supply of the k th asset in terms of its total value, y k , is a normal random variable, independent of other random variables, with mean 0  k y and precision k  . 9 Suppose that uninformed investors conjecture the following equilibrium price (it will be verified later that this conjecture is self-fulfilling):
where
are constants and will be given in Proposition 1 below. 10
To facilitate analysis, we define a random variable that 9 It is well-known that the market must have some noise to avoid a perfectly revealing equilibrium. Asymmetric information models (e.g., Admati (1985) , Easley and O'Hara (2004) ) typically assume that the number of per-capita supply of a stock is a normal random variable. Since the supply randomness is usually considered as the result of trading by liquidity traders who buy or sell an asset for their liquidity purposes, regardless of its price, assuming random total supply value seems reasonable if it is not more plausible.
The assumption 0  k y implies a positive supply on average. 10 To ease exposition, we have dropped subscript k in
Since uninformed investors can compute k  by price and public information, observing signal k  is equivalent to observing price signal p k . It is clear that
. From public information and signal k  , the uninformed investors form their posterior beliefs on asset k as:
In (10), the conditional mean and conditional precision can be expressed as
As expected, (6) and (11) show that the posterior mean is a weighted average of prior mean and signals' means while (7) and (12) demonstrate that the posterior precision is the sum of prior precision and signals' precisions.
B. Investors' Optimal Portfolios
Let investor i's initial wealth endowment be i m . If he/she allocates i k x dollars to asset k (k = 1, 2, …, K) and i f x dollars to the risk-free asset at date 0, his/her wealth at date 1 is
where the risk-free asset is assumed to be the numeraire and has a zero return. To compute investors' demands for assets, we assume that they have identical utility with
, where δ > 0 is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion. Substituting (13) into the utility function, the expected utility of investor i can be expressed as
where i  is the information set of investor i at the time he/she is making investment decision. 11 In deriving (14), we have noticed that the return on asset k,
is conditionally normal so that (5) and (10) imply
Thus, the maximization of (14) yields the optimal investment strategy for investor i:
In (15), (6)-(7) or (11)-(12), depending on whether investor i receives private signals of asset k or not. The optimal investment (15) is well behaved and has the properties as expected. It shows that an investor invests more in an asset as the expectation of the logarithm of its future value increases and/or the uncertainty becomes smaller. The investment also increases when the conditional expected return,
, is higher. However, when the price of an asset rises, the relative investment in this particular asset declines. As the investor is more risk-averse, he/she reduces his/her investment across all risky assets and increases his/her holding of the risk-free asset. By simple manipulation, we find that investor i choose the following optimal portfolio of risky assets:
is the normalization coefficient.
C. Rational Expectations Equilibrium
Normalize the total number of investors to 1, with k  investors observing both private and public signals of asset k and k   1 investors observing public signals only (k = 1,…, K). We consider rational expectations equilibrium; i.e., each investor's expectation is self-fulfilling in equilibrium. The market clearing condition requires the aggregate demand for each asset equal to its aggregate supply, i.e.,
Recalling (6), (7), (11) and (12), we obtain the equilibrium prices after inserting optimal investment in (15) into (17). This is summarized in Proposition 1 below. PROPOSITION 1. There exists a partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium in which,
where coefficients B's are given in the proof of the proposition in Appendix A.
The price formula in equation (18) represents the price discount the investors require to hold the risky security. The larger the supply y k relative to its mean k y , the larger the discount.
III. The Information-adjusted CAPM
A. Expected Returns
Conditional on his/her information, investor i's expected return on asset k is 
11 Because investors make their investment decision by maximizing their conditional mean-variance utility, it is obvious that the risky portfolio } { i k t as characterized by (16) is the tangency portfolio of investor i, according to his/her posterior belief of returns on risky assets. Moreover, applying the result of conditional mean-variance efficiency of each investor's investment decision it can be easily shown that the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM conditionally holds for the average conditional belief in (20)-(21); that is, the conditional expectation of excess return on a portfolio of risky assets is equal to the conditional expectation of market excess return times the conditional market beta of the portfolio. A similar result is also obtained by other rational expectations models such as Admati (1985) . However, the main interest of this paper is to develop an asset pricing model that holds unconditionally. For this end, we first need to find out the unconditional expected returns on all individual risky assets, which will be given in Proposition 2 below. Secondly, we have to determine what factors summarize the systemic risk of an asset or a portfolio. To deal with this, we, following the classic CAPM, identify a portfolio in the next subsection that captures the supply and information characteristics of the entire market so that it plays the same role as the market portfolio does in the classic CAPM.
PROPOSITION 2. The unconditional expected value and precision of return r k on asset k (k = 1,…, K) are given by
Proposition 2 
 reduces to k  if the portfolio includes risky asset k only. The justification for the information index as a suitable measure of the amount of information on a security or a portfolio can be further seen from Lemma 1 in the next section. It attains a maximum of 1 (or a minimum of 0) if the amount of the information (or, more precisely, the total information quality as defined in Lemma 1) is infinite (or zero).
Based on the information index, we can introduce the information-adjusted market portfolio to incorporate information effects. Since the average market supply of assets k is k y (k = 1,…, K), each weight in the market portfolio is given by Remarks on the Information-adjusted CAPM 1. It is the information-adjusted beta, rather than the market beta, that can solely explain the systematic variation in returns and no other factor is required to explain the variation. The unconditional expected excess return on an asset is proportionate to its information-adjusted beta, and the beta premium is positive and equal to the unconditional expected excess return on the IaMP.
2. The essential difference between the IaCAPM and the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM is that the market portfolio and market beta are replaced by the IaMP and informationadjusted beta. In the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM, investors are symmetric and are supposed to know the true joint distribution of returns. Under this information environment, all investors hold an identical portfolio in equilibrium. Consequently, the systematic variation in the return on an individual asset is completely captured by its covariance with the market return. Nevertheless, when investors do not have complete agreement on asset returns, investors in the market have to collect information to update their beliefs. This results in diverse information indexes. The 14 covariance of the return on a security with the market return, or the market beta, cannot capture this information effect on the market and in turn the market beta cannot properly reveal the systematic risk a stock. Instead, Proposition 3 asserts that the systematic variation of returns is jointly captured by the information index and market capitalization, or more precisely, the information-adjusted beta. Based on the data used in Figure 1 , 13 
The IaCAPM established in
IV. Why Does the Classic CAPM Fail in Empirical Tests?
The IaCAPM suggests that empirical tests should be carried out by regressing excess return on information-adjusted beta in cross-sectional analysis or on the risk premium of the IaMP in time-series analysis. When regressions use market beta or market excess return as the only explanatory variable, they fail to capture the crosssectional variability in information quality, as indicated in Proposition 4. This may be partially responsible for various anomalies discovered in the existing tests of the classic CAPM. This section details the IaCAPM's explanation to these anomalies.
A. Why Is the Slope of Empirical Relation between Market Beta and Average Return So
Flat?
The first anomaly we are going to examine is the empirical finding of the flatter slope, i.e., beta premium obtained in cross-sectional analysis is much smaller than the 12 There are other sufficient conditions for the prediction of the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM overstating or understating returns. But only considering these two scenarios is enough for our purpose because market betas and weights of portfolios are generally positive in empirical studies cited in the next section. 13 An additional ingredient is ω*, which is equal to 0.31 according to the calculation shown in the proof of Proposition 4. average excess market return (see, Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972), and Fama French (1992) ). To facilitate the analysis, let us introduce a measure of the absolute information quality of a risky security, i.e., the total information precision of asset k,
. Correspondingly, the information quality of a portfolio is defined by a harmonic average of individual qualities,
. There is a close relationship between the information index and information quality, as demonstrated by the lemma below.
LEMMA 1. For each asset, information index k  and information quality k  have the following properties:
. For a portfolio, the corresponding properties are:
for all k.
To see why the empirical line is flatter, we rewrite the IaCAPM as The classic CAPM claims that the beta premium is positive. Statistically, this claim is valid if the null hypothesis,
can be rejected in the following cross-sectional analysis
for pre-selected portfolios P (P = 1, 2, …, N). Note that the corresponding t-test statistic for testing the above null hypothesis is 19 where the variance of return, ) var( P r , is equal to 2 P  if the slope  b in (27) is assumed to be constant across portfolios, as done in the existing cross-sectional analysis, and  b is the least squares estimate of  b .
Unfortunately, finance literature has documented that the data collected for empirical analysis are often unable to reject the above null hypothesis (see, for instance, Fama and French, 1992, p. 428) . To understand why the null hypothesis of 0   b cannot be rejected in theory, let us return to equation (26). According to it, observed data on return and market beta in cross-sectional analysis do not follow a regression equation with a constant slope as assumed by (27). Rather, the slope in (26) 
Consequently, it leads to a smaller value of t-test statistic in (28). This explain, to some extent, why econometricians often cannot reject the null hypothesis of 0   b .
C. Why Is Jensen's Alpha Not Equal to Zero?
We now turn to time-series regression for a portfolio, P,
15 See Fitzmaurice, Laid and Ware (2004) for an overview about random-coefficient regression analysis.
20
where intercept P a should be zero according to the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM. However, the regularity found in time-series regressions of excess portfolio return on excess market return is that the intercepts are positive when portfolios have low market betas but negative when portfolios have high betas (Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972), Fama and French (2004) ). The IaCAPM may shed light on this conflict between theory and empirical findings. To demonstrate this, let us rewrite equation (25) as
which implies that the intercept in equation (29) is given by
Hence, applying Proposition 5 and Corollary 1 immediately yields the corollary below: 
D. Does Size Matter?
Starting from the late 1970s, a number of empirical evidences have shown that much of the variation in expected return is unrelated to the market beta. One of most prominent anomalies in asset pricing literature is the relation between return and firm size, first discovered by Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981 
IV. Concluding Remarks
This paper develops a new asset pricing model based on unconditional statistical analysis and illustrates that the assumption of complete agreement among all investors in a market is likely to be one of the major reasons for various anomalies discovered in the empirical tests of the classic CAPM. The reality of financial markets is that investors have diverse judgments and beliefs about the returns on risky assets and they frequently update their beliefs based on information they received. By removing the assumption of complete agreement, the Information-adjusted CAPM concludes that the unconditional expected return on a risky asset or a portfolio of assets is solely determined by the information-adjusted beta rather than the market beta. More specifically, it postulates that the unconditional expected return on a risky asset/portfolio is equal to the riskless interest rate plus the product of the informationadjusted beta and the unconditional expected excess return on the IaMP. Furthermore, the IaCAPM not only specifies the conditions under which the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM overstates or understates the expected return on a portfolio but also provides a formula to estimate the prediction error made by the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM. From a practical perspective, the IaCAPM introduces a new approach to analyze the empirical anomalies of the classic CAPM, including a flatter relation between average return and market 22 beta than the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM predicts, a non-zero Jensen's alpha, the lack of explanatory power of market beta, and the size effect.
The empirical problems of the classic CAPM lead researchers to ask whether it is possible to empirically test the CAPM. The famous Roll's (1977) critique argues that the CAPM has never been and will probably never be tested because the theory of the (Stambaugh (1982) ). Even for a market portfolio including international assets, market beta still cannot explain the anomalies of the classic CAPM (Fama and French (1998)). While enlarging the -market‖ coverage to include more assets into the market portfolio is likely to make it closer to the -true‖ market portfolio, the IaCAPM suggests that the key for a successful test is not to extend the coverage of the market portfolio after it has a sufficiently large span. Rather, correct weights of the benchmark portfolio are more important. The market portfolio should be adjusted by the information index to reflect the uneven information distribution across assets. 
Appendix A. Proofs of Propositions and Corollaries
Proof of Proposition 1: Substituting equation (15) into (17) 
as defined in (21), substituting (6)- (7) and (11)-(12) into (A1) and then using (9) to eliminate k  yield
Comparing the coefficients of k g and k y with their counterparts in (9), we obtain Proof of Lemma 1: Claim (iii) is obvious so we first consider (i)-(ii). For simplicity, we suppress subscript k, then
